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‘Make Sure They Count Nicely This Time’
The Politics of Election Observing in Zimbabwe
Sara Rich Dorman1
 This paper examines the controversy surrounding Zimbabwe’s elections in 2000 and
2002.  It situates these elections against Zimbabwe’s experiences of elections since 1980.
It argues that the conditions for this controversy emerged from the institutions and
practices that developed in Zimbabwe from the time of independence.  At the same time,
election observers – influenced both by criticism of earlier observation missions in Africa
and international policy concerns – were positioned to make an example of the
Zimbabwe elections.  The Zimbabwe elections became an international crisis point not
because of observer reports or electoral fraud, but because of the politics surrounding
Zimbabwe’s relations with the outside world.
Shut your dirty mouths. We do not want to hear that [elections would not be free and fair]
from you. You are not our judges. You are not our keepers. Leave us alone.
Robert G. Mugabe2
On the basis of observations made during the voting, verification and counting process on
the ground and the objective realities, the OAU Observer Team wishes to state that in
general the elections were transparent, credible, free and fair.
OAU Observer Mission3
We were deeply impressed by the determination of the people of Zimbabwe to exercise
their democratic rights, very often under difficult conditions…However, it was clear to us
that while the actual polling and counting processes were peaceful and the secrecy of the
ballot was assured, the Presidential election in Zimbabwe was marred by a high level of
politically motivated violence and intimidation, which preceded the poll….. [which]
brings us to the conclusion that the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for
a free expression of will by the electors.
Commonwealth Observer Group4
                                             
1 The paper is based on research on Zimbabwe between 1994 and 2003, and participation
as a member of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches Ecumenical Peace Observer Mission
during the 2000 Parliamentary elections.  Previous drafts of this paper were presented at
African Studies Seminars at the University of Oxford in October 2000 and the University
of Edinburgh in July 2002, under the title “A Flee and Fear Affair”.
2 “Leave Zimbabwe alone: West told” Herald 28 February 2002.
3 OAU Observer Mission. OAU Endorses 'Free And Fair' Zimbabwe Presidential Poll
PRESS RELEASE March 13, 2002.
4 Preliminary Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group to the Presidential Election
in Zimbabwe 9 – 10 March 2002 .  14 March 2002
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I. Introduction
Election-observing has brought a new dynamic to relations between African states and
inter-governmental institutions.  The recent Zimbabwean elections had implications far
beyond Zimbabwe’s borders, as they entangled the presidents of Nigeria and South
Africa along with the prime minister of the United Kingdom in a set of negotiations in
which appearances, perceptions and rhetoric were as important as actual events.
The politics of election observing in Zimbabwe reveals the existence of
fundamental questions not only about autonomy and sovereignty versus international
pressure, but also about the right of citizens to hold their own governments to account not
just through the ballot, but about the ballot.5 This paper examines the controversy
surrounding Zimbabwe’s elections in 2000 and 2002.  It situates these elections against
Zimbabwe’s experiences of elections since 1980.  It argues that the conditions for the
controversy in 2000 and 2002 emerged from the institutions and practices that developed
in Zimbabwe from the time of independence.  At the same time, election observers –
influenced both by criticism of earlier observation missions in Africa and international
policy concerns – were positioned to make an example of the Zimbabwe elections.
While many of the problems with election observing had been identified in previous
elections, and critical studies of observers, the conflicting reports about the Zimbabwean
elections threatened to turn into a major international diplomatic row.
The controversy surrounding election observing has two main poles of debate.
The first is the issue of ‘moving goalposts’.  Election observing, as an ad-hoc innovation
which has taken flight in the post Cold War period, is in a constant state of flux.
Important questions need to be asked about what exactly observers observe and how. The
motives of election observers, often described as ‘electoral tourists’ are increasingly
called into question.6 Some question if it is even possible for observers to appreciate the
                                             
5 Interestingly, the Commonwealth delegation to Zimbabwe’s 1980 elections is
considered the first observer mission in Africa, giving Zimbabwe the longest history of
election-observation in Africa. Eric Bjornlund, Michael Bratton and Clark Gibson,
“Observing Multi-party elections in Africa: lessons from Zambia” African Affairs 91
(1992), 407.
6   For two trenchant critiques see Gisela Geisler, “Fair?  What has Fairness got to do
with it? Vagaries of Election Observing and Democratic Standards.  JMAS  31(1993),
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nuances of local politics and come to any conclusions regarding the elections.7  Elections
in Kenya (1992), Ghana (1992)  and Uganda (1996) were controversial because dubious
procedures before polling days did not prevent  the certification of elections as ‘free and
fair’.  Critics suggested that by limiting themselves to observing only the election-days,
and not the campaigning, preparation of electoral rolls, and constituency delimitation,
observers failed to consider the entirety of the process.8  These inconsistencies appear to
leave inordinate space for personal and national politics to influence decisions.
The second set of debates relates to the uncertainty about the role and identity of
observers.  As Ineke van Kessel has argued, observers may have roles as either peace
guarantors or as critical judges, but they cannot do both.9  Increasingly, observers sent by
donors are perceived as judges, upon whose decisions future aid and international
alignment depends.  In this case, the politics of who can observe and what privileges it
gives them becomes paramount.  There are generally two categories of observers. Those
from outside the country include northern donor countries or groups of countries,
intergovernmental organizations like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or the
Commonwealth, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  Local
NGOs often provide much higher numbers of individuals on the ground, who in
Zimbabwean legislation are referred to as ‘monitors’ and longer-term and better informed
observation as has been argued in some detail by Nevitte and Canton.10  Yet as in
                                                                                                                                    
613-637 and  Thomas Carothers, “The Observers Observed” Journal of Democracy 8
(1997), 31.
7    Rijk van Dijk, “Secret Worlds, Democratization and Election Observation in Malawi”
in Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling eds. Election Observation and Democratization in
Africa  (London: Macmillan, 2000).
8  On Kenya and Ghana see G isler, “Fair?  613-637; on Uganda see Laurie Cooper and
Daniel Stroux, “International Election Observation in Uganda: Compromise at the
expense of substance” Afrika Spectrum, 31 (1996), 201-209; for a more controversial
analysis of the South African Elections of 1994 see In ke van Kessel, “Stability or
Democracy: on the role of Monitors, Media and Miracles” in  Jon Abbink and Gerti
Hesseling eds. Election Observation and Democratization in Africa  (London:
Macmillan, 2000).
9   Ineke van Kessel, “Stability or Democracy: on the role of Monitors, Media and
Miracles” in  Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling eds. Election Observation and
Democratization in Africa  (London: Macmillan, 2000).
10 Neil Nevitte and Santiago A. Canton, “The role of domestic observers” Journal of
Democracy 8, 3 (1997); see also Geisler, “Fair?” 634-5,
4
Zimbabwe, these monitors may be vulnerable to manipulation and accusations of
partisanship. International observers were similarly accused of reflecting the interests of
their home countries. The role of international observers became particularly salient as
both the government and the opposition called upon neighbours and donors for solidarity
during the elections.  As the veteran human rights activist and Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) MP Paul Themba Nyathi wrote,
…conditions for a free and fair poll don’t exist….it is merely academic to
talk of a free and fair presidential election in Zimbabwe in
2002…..Zimbabwe’s friends in Sadc, the Commonwealth and the EU
should now concern themselves with two matters only:  In the event of
Mugabe bulldozing his way to victory should such an outcome be
recognised? In the event of the MDC winning under such appallingly
difficult circumstances, what package of quick-impact assistance will they
be in a position to offer the people of Zimbabwe? 11
Or, in the words of a Bulawayo market woman, speaking to a group of election
observers: “Make sure they count nicely this time”.12
II. Zimbabwe’s elections:  from jubilation to apathy
Between 1980 and 2000, levels of contestation and of voter participation in elections
changed dramatically. As the ruling party’s domination of the electoral process increased,
turn-out and participation decreased.13
In  the ‘liberation election’ of 1980, to many peoples’ surprise, Robert Mugabe’s
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) won a majority of seats in the Parliament, 57
out of 80.  The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the other liberation
movement which had fought the guerilla war, won 20 seats, mainly in the region of
Matabeleland.  The moderate United African National Council (UANC) of Bishop Abel
Muzorewa won 3. In 1985, these patterns were reinforced, with ZANU gaining 64 to
ZAPU’s  15, and 1 for Ndabaningi Sithole’s splinter group ZANU(Ndonga).   The 1987
                                             
11 Paul Themba Nyathi, “Will Zimbabwe’s friends recognise poll outcome?” Zimbabwe
Independent 7 December 2001.
12 Research notes 25 June 2000.
13 For a detailed analysis of this process see: Liisa Laakso, “When Elections are just a
Formality” in Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso eds. Multi-party Elections in Africa
(Oxford: James Currey, 2002).
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Unity Accord incorporated ZAPU into ZANU  “eliminat[ing] the thorniest source of
opposition.”14  This appeared to be a step towards ZANU’s long-term goal of adopting a
one-party state.  Before the 1990 election, however, the governing party  was
unexpectedly challenged from the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), led by former
ZANU stalwart Edgar Tekere.  Tekere had been expelled from ZANU(PF) over his
opposition to the one-party state.  ZUM won only two seats in the parliamentary election
but  20% of the overall vote.Tekere won 22% of the presidential vote, and his party
averaged about 30% in the urban areas, although they won no seats. Despite the
unexpectedly strong opposition from ZUM, 14 seats were not contested in this election.
After the 1990 election ZUM itself fragmented, and a splinter regrouped as  the
Democratic Party.15  Other fragments of ZUM helped form the Forum Party in 1993,
which was expected to provide a strong challenge to ZANU(PF) in the 1995 elections,
but which was also weakened due to factional divisions. The 1995 election was the least
contested of all Zimbabwe’s elections, 55 seats were won uncontested by ZANU (PF),
adding these seats to the 30 seats directly appointed by the President, ZANU was
guaranteed a parliamentary majority before polling began.  The main opposition to
ZANU was provided by the United Parties (UP) – combining Muzorewa’s UANC with
Forum, ZUM, and ZANU-Ndonga as an electoral front – which made little impact in the
1995 parliamentary and decided at the last minute to boycott the 1996 presidential
elections.16
Inside ZANU, however, the elections were hotly contested through primary
elections. Several sitting MPs were not re-selected to represent the party, in what
appeared to be local level revolts against the quality of representation.  At the same time,
allegations were voiced that candidates were imposed by the party leadership in other
constituencies. Margaret Dongo, an ex-combatant, ex-CIO agent, and the sitting MP for
Harare South, was widely thought not to have been re-selected because she had been too
                                             
14  Tandeka Nkiwane, “Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: the Struggle within the
Struggle” in Abdebayo Olukoshi, The Politics of Opposition in Africa (Uppsala, Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, 1998),  92
15  “Magoche factions launches democratic party, Sunday Mail, 29 September 1991, 1;
“ZUM announces new executive” Herald 30 October 1991, 5; “Who is who in ZUM”
Sunday Mail, 10 November 1991, 1.
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vocally critical of government policy in Parliament.  As an incumbent MP, Dongo had
the highest-profile of the candidates who ran under the banner ‘ZANU (PF)
Independents’.  None of them won their elections.
However, this intra-party contestation did lead to the re-emergence of inter-party
contestation.  When Dongo lost the Harare South election she successfully contested the
result in court and convincingly won the re-run election.17  By supporting an informal
grouping of candidates to challenge ZANU(PF) in the 1996 municipal elections, Dongo
began a crucial process of consistently and thoroughly fighting elections — not just
complaining about unfair playing fields. Dongo’s Independent Candidates — later  the
Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD) — rapidly became expert both at exposing
fraudulent registrations and encouraging their supporters to register to vote. 18   ZUD was
expected to be the main challenger to ZANU (PF) in the 2000 elections.  However,
following personality clashes, exacerbated by CIO infiltration, the party split into two
camps in mid-1999.19  The formation of an off-shoot called Zimbabwe Union of
Democrats – Transparency Front, was claimed as a victory by CIO agents.20
The most effective opposition party since independence emerged from the parallel
mobilizations of churches and NGOs and trades unions in the late 1990s.  The MDC,
launched in 1999, drew on the legacy of the Zimbabwe Congress Of Trades Unions and
the National Constitutional Assembly, which defeated the government’s draft constitution
in the February 2000 referendum.  As we will see, in the 2000 and 2002 elections, the
MDC provided a unprecedentedly viable alternative to ZANU(PF).
                                                                                                                                    
16  Interview, Isaac Manyemba, Information Secretary, UP, 16 June 1997.
17  Dongo v. Mwashita & ORS 13 & 27 July and 10 & 30 August 1995 Judgement No.
HH-106-95, ZLR 1995 (2) 228 (H);  Interview Margaret Dongo, ZUD, 17 June 1997.
18 Interview, Margaret Dongo, ZUD, 17 June 1997; Interview Kempton Makamure,
ZUD,16 June 1997; “Dongo launches political party” Sunday Mail, 20 December 1998
provides a surprisingly detailed and sympathetic portrait of Dongo’s agenda.  Kempton
Makamure, “Its time we graduated from personality politics” Independent, 28 May 1999.
19 “ZUD claims CIO infiltration” Standard 23 May 1999; Kempton Makamure, “Its time
we graduated from personality politics” Independent, 28 May 1999; “Things fall apart:
Margaret Dongo, Kempton Makamure part ways” Parade September 1999, 3, 43.
20  “CIO claims victory for splitting Dongo’s party” Independent, 16 July 1999.
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Violence and Intimidation of Opposition Candidates
Until 2000, Zimbabwe’s opposition parties were largely ineffective in attracting national-
level support.  After the merger of ZANU and ZAPU, the new parties which emerged had
only limited appeal to mostly urban, upper-income voters. They were unable to counter
ZANU(PF)’s domination of the ideological spectrum. Opposition parties were also
vulnerable to infiltration, which led to increased distrust and fragmentation.  Yet, it is
important not to ignore  the history of intimidation and violence directed at those who did
dare to challenge ZANU’s supremacy.  The tactics used in 2000 and 2002 did not come
out of nowhere.
The 1980s were marked by the violent civil war in Matabeleland, in which
government troops appeared to be targeting ZAPU supporters, and ex-ZIPRA combatants
within the population.  During this period, ZAPU MPs were arrested and imprisoned, and
the leader of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo spent several years in self-imposed exile.  The 1985
elections, which took place in the middle of this conflict, seem to have been relatively
peaceful, but were marked by post-election violence in urban areas, as ZANU(PF)
women’s league members attacked the homes of opposition supporters after the election
results were declared.
Bishop Muzorewa, who remained head of the UANC,  was detained for 10
months in 1983-84 on charges which included conspiring with his “intimate friends in the
leadership of the South African government”21 o  “making derogatory remarks about the
government of Zimbabwe”22 to funding “former ZIPRA dissidents” and conspiring with
Israel, Zaire, and Uganda.23  Ndabaningi Sithole,  the leader of ZANU-Ndonga, which
retained support in the Ndau areas of Manicaland, remained out of the country in self-
imposed exile until 1992. After his return, his peri-urban farm was designated for
acquisition, apparently for political reasons.24  His arrest and trial in 1995 for treason was
                                             
21  “Muzorewa arrested” Herald 2 November 1983, 1; “Why Muzorewa being detained -
Premier” Herald 4 November 1983.
22  “New grounds for the detention of Muzorewa” Herald 5 November 1983, 1.
23  “Bishop’s Zaire link exposed” Herald 19 November 1983, 1.
24  See for instance, Sam Moyo, The Land Question in Zimbabwe (Harare: SAPES, 1995),
257; “Churu farm: the land blues continue” SAPEM 7, 1 (October 1993), 9-11.
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also widely interpreted as politically motivated.25  Convicted and sentenced to one year in
jail, Sithole denied allegations that he plotted to assassinate President Mugabe and
organised military training outside the country for his recruits.26
In 1990, Patrick Kombayi, another prominent ex-ZANU(PF) member, contesting
the Gweru Central constituency for ZUM was shot and other supporters were beaten.
ZUM was accused of accepting donations from the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
(CAZ).27  Mugabe accused ZUM of being a puppet organization of former Rhodesian
Front leader Ian Smith28 and alleged that Tekere was plotting a coup that included the
assassination of all the ZANU(PF) leadership.29  The implication of these allegations was
that ZUM supported Zimbabwe’s external enemies, as it was also contended  that ZUM
was being backed by South African interests, and had connections with the Mozambican
RENAMO.30
While the 1995 election was the least contested and probably the most peaceful, it
was not completely uneventful. Margaret Dongo’s court challenge over the election
fought in Harare South revealed that in addition to irregularities in the voter’s roll, the
government also stuffed the ballot boxes, such that there were over 1 000 more ballots
counted than had been issued to voters.31  Fidelis Mhashu, a former ZANU(PF) member,
who contested the 1996 Chitungwiza mayoral election as an independent was  attacked
and beaten by a crowd of ZANU(PF) supporters reported to include four MPs, including
Cabinet Minister Witness Mangwende.  Despite his being badly beaten, the police, who
were present at the time of the attack, did not lay any charges.32  From 1980 to 2000,
violence and intimidation during elections was not prevented by the forces of the state.
                                             
25  “Sithole Refused Trial Date in Plot to Kill Mugabe” Sapa-AFP 1 June 1996.
26  “Sithole says he is innocent of treason charges.”  Independent 27 June 1997, 1.
27  “Farmers, traders deny backing ZUM” Herald 9 March 1990, 1; “ZUM Sees nothing
wrong in getting aid from anyone” Herald 12 March 1990, 1.
28 “General Election a real test for unity – President” Herald 17 March 1990, 1, 5.
29  “Tekere plotting coup” Herald 19 March 1990, 1.
30   “Farmers, traders deny backing ZUM” Herald 9 March 1990, 1; “Farm leaders and
business back president and party” Herald 16 March 1990, 1, 7.
31  John Makumbe and Daniel Compagnon, Behind the Smokescreen: The Politics of
Zimbabwe’s 1995 General Elections (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 2000), 220.
32  Interview, Fidelis Mhashu, 17 June 1997.
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Instead, it was implicitly condoned, through the issuing of blanket pardons to
aggressors.33
III. The Elections Machinery
Yet the legacy of violence was probably not the most salient factor in Zimbabwean
elections.  More significant was the politicization of the institutions responsible for
conducting elections, and the incremental fusing of party and state. Throughout the 1980s
the rhetoric of the ruling ZANU(PF)  advocated the creation of a dejure one party state.
Only in September 1990 did the party’s Central Committee decide against legislatively
enacting it.34 Despite this, during the 1990 and 1995 elections the electoral system
became progressively more identified with the party. The institutions responsible for
administering the election include the office of the Registrar-General and the Elections
Directorate, whose tasks are to supervise the delimitation committee and the voter
registration process. The distinction between the two offices is not clear to most
observers.  The Registrar-General Tobaiwa Mudede, has come to be seen as a ZANU(PF)
loyalist. In contrast, the teachers and civil servants employed to conduct the election on
the ground – presiding officers and other officials – maintained their reputation for
independence throughout the 1990s.  Nevertheless, serious questions have been raised
about the accuracy of the voter’s rolls prepared by the Elections Directorate and the
impartiality of the Delimitation Commission.
Voter registration
Between 1985 and 2000, election registration became increasingly biased against the
opposition.35  The voter registration exercises in 1985 and 1990 were dubious procedure
and, in both cases the Registrar-General announced just before the elections, that all
Zimbabwean citizens would be allowed to vote upon presentation of proof of citizenship
                                             
33  For a review of amnesties given for politically motivated violence see: Amani Trust,
“IMPUNITY IN ZIMBABWE” 11 October 2000.
34  “No one-party state by law – President” Herald 28 September 1990, 1; “No move on
one-party issue” Herald 3 October 1990, 1.
35  Laakso, “When elections are just a formality” 333.
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and residence.36 Although a new, accurate registration was supposed to take place before
the 1995 election, in practice, the electoral roll appears to have been equally defective.  In
urban areas, prospective voters queued for several days in attempts to register, and many
reports emerged of deceased voters being registered, names misspelled, and other
inaccuracies. There was also deliberate tampering with the roll. Margaret Dongo’s court
case challenging the results in Harare South revealed serious defects in the electoral roll,
including the registration of many non-resident voters.  Makumbe and Compagnon
suggest that at least 41% of the names on the roll were inaccurate.37 Irregularities led to
the entire election being condemned as ‘free but unfair’ by internal monitors.38
Electoral rolls were particularly flawed in the contested municipal elections of
1996. Priscilla Misihairabwi, an NGO activist who sought to contest the urban council
elections as an Independent Candidate, compiled such a convincing dossier of fraudulent
voter registrations in Harare’s Avenues district (including vacant lots with hundreds of
registered voters) that ZANU(PF) sought to force her out — with the Registrar-General,
Tobaiwa Mudede,  declaring her candidacy invalid. 39 Similarly, Fidelis Mhashu, the
former ZANU(PF) municipal councilor who contested the Chitungwiza mayoral election
as an independent candidate after failing to get selected as the official ZANU(PF)
candidate, convinced the High Court that the Chitungwiza electoral roll — comprised
only of home-owners, although most residents were renting accommodation — “was so
defective that it cannot be said that the electoral process was itself  not flawed.”40
                                             
36 Laakso, “When elections are just a formality” 333, 334; Jonathan Moyo, Voting for
Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1992), 77-
78, 149.
37   Makumbe and Compagnon, “Behind the smokescreen” 69-70.
38  Maxie Matavaire, “Elections free, not fair” Sunday Gazette, 23 April 1995, Ramson
Muzondo, “1995 elections unfair” Sunday Gazette, 13 August 1995, “Election was
unfair: ZCC” Herald, 21 August 1995, and “State Press snaps at watchdog’s ‘unfair poll’
verdict.” Horizon, July 1995, 9.
39  Research notes, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 21 July 1997;  Interview, Priscilla
Misihairambwi,  18 June 1997; “Court rules Misihairabwi had right to contest poll”
Herald 8 August 1997, 1, 17.
40  Fidelis George Mhashu v. Tichakunda Chiroodza & Chitungwiza Town Council &
Andrew Jiri & ZANU (PF) & Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban




In general, constituency delimitation appears to have tended to remove constituencies
from ‘opposition’ regions and add them to what were then ‘government’ strongholds.
For instance, in the 1995 delimitation exercise, constituencies were removed from
Manicaland, Masvingo, Matabeleland South, and the Midlands while new ones were
created in Harare, Mashonaland South and Mashonaland Centre.  Particularly
controversial were last minute ‘corrections’ to the delimitation report were issued which
moved the high density area of Mkoba from Gweru Central to the predominantly rural
Gweru South.  As Patrick Kombayi, the ZUM candidate had most of his support in
Mkoba, this gave Vice-President Simon Muzenda, the ZANU (PF) candidate, a distinct
advantage.  As Jonathan Moyo pointed out  “the general public was left with the
impression that President Mugabe had used the commission to protect his Vice-President,
Simon Muzenda, who appeared to be heading for certain defeat.”41 Other constituencies
expected to support opposition candidates had perceived ZANU(PF) strongholds added to
them: Harare North, mainly a low-density suburb included Hatcliffe number 1, a high
density area, and Hatcliffe extension, a holding camp for squatters;   Bulawayo South, a
mainly  low-density constituency had the high density suburb of Nketa added to it in
1995.
The Electoral Supervisory Commission: an ineffective watchdog
According to the Zimbabwean constitution, the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC)
is supposed to monitor and oversee the administration of the elections.  In practice, the
ESC has proved an  ineffective and non-impartial watchdog. It is directly appointed by
the President, and has little autonomous power or resources.42 In 1995 the process of
election monitoring by local organizations was initiated, because the ESC had no
                                             
41  Moyo, Voting for Democracy, 147
42  “ESC Sworn in” Herald, 7 July 1994; “Political parties lambast poll team” Daily
Gazette, 8 July 1994; “Commission now better equipped to supervise poll” Herald 27
March 1995; “Matchaba Hove blasts poll commission” Daily News 24 October 2001.
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capacity to do so itself.43  The feedback from these monitors, however, has been
consistently critical of the election process.  In order to avoid the embarrassment of
acknowledging internal criticism, reports from the ESC on the conduct of elections have
been softly-phrased, delayed and ignored by the government.
IV. The 2000 and 2002 elections: intensification
The 2000 and 2002 elections took place in the context of political and economic crisis.
The regime was being challenged by widespread public protests, and it had lost the first
national referendum since independence in February 2000.  The emergence of a broad-
based opposition from the labour movement and NGO sector also attracted support from
the business community and previously apolitical white voters. Prominent ZUD
candidates, Misihairabwi and Mhashu,  also joined the MDC.44 The stage was thus set for
a bitter struggle.
As in the past, the elections were run by the Director-General and the Elections
Directorate, and ‘overseen’ by the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). The ESC,
however, was a less willing accomplice than in the past.  Frustration with the conduct of
the local council elections in 1998 and 1999, led to much more open criticism.45  The
long-time chair, former Anglican Bishop Peter Hatendi, resigned in protest at government
obstruction in January 2000.46  The remaining three  members were also much more
public about their predicament, and called for an independent body to be set up to oversee
the elections.47  When, a week before the nomination court was to sit, the ESC had not
received details of constituency boundaries or polling stations, they complained that the
                                             
43  ZCC,  Annual report 1994-1995. 5 July 1995, 56; Research notes,  ZCC Election
briefing, 20 June 2000.
44  “Misihairabwi joins MDC” Standard, 5 March 2000; “ZUD official defects to MDC”
Mirror  24 March 2000; “Mhashu to contest in Chitungwiza East” Standard, 20 February
2000.
45  “Recommendations on electoral conduct made” H rald 18 February 1999, 11; “ESC
concerned with by-election delays” Herald 22 February 1999, 6.
46 “Case for an independent electoral body” Mirror  17 September 1999, 6; “Polls conduct
taxes man of the cloth’s patience” Financial Gazette, 30 September 1999, 3; “ESC
members protest”  Financial Gazette 30 March 2000.
47  “ESC members protest”  Financial Gazette 30 March 2000.
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Elections Directorate was ‘not co-operative’.48 An ex-combatant and retired army
colonel, Sobuza Gula-Ndebele, was appointed as head of the ESC in June 2000 just days
before the election.49 In 2002, Douglas Nyikayaramba, variously reported to be a serving
or retired brigadier in the Zimbabwe National Army was appointed as the  Electoral
Supervisory Commission’s chief executive officer.50
The Electoral Roll and Voting
A UN Electoral Assistance Mission assessed the electoral roll in December 1999 and
calculated that between 10 and 20 percent of the names on the voter’s roll were deceased
and that as many as two million voters — 40 percent of the electorate — had moved
constituency since 1995 without being re-registered.51  A study carried out by a local
NGO on the municipal elections in July 1999 gave similar results.52   Ministry officials
said that 5.1 million out of a potential 5.5 million voters had been registered between
January and March 2000.  The voters roll opened for inspection in June, but many
mistakes were found:  voters who claimed to have registered were not there, others found
discrepancies in their ID numbers and name-spelling, while others noted that the names
of many deceased voters were still present on the list. A supplementary roll was created
for those who were registered between April and June, although it was in fact mainly a
list of those who found themselves not on the roll and re-registered.53
In 2002 the process of creating the voters’ roll was decidedly untransparent. The
voters’ roll inspection, which started on 19 November and was expected to end on 9
                                             
48  “ESC hamstrung: parties” Daily News 29 May 2000.
49  “Gula-Ndebele tipped to head ESC” Independent 9 June 2000.
50  “Army deployed to supervise poll process” Independent 8 February 2002
51  EU Election Observation Mission, Report of the EU Election Observation Mission on
the Parliamentary Elections which took place in Zimbabwe on 24th and 25th June 2000,
chapter 3, 10.
52 FODEZI, The state of the voter’s roll: preliminary findings local authority elections
(1999). Interviews,  Rashida Fazilahmed,  FODEZI,  8 October 1999;  Dr Christopher
Mushonga, FODEZI, 8 October 1999.
53  See for instance, EU Election Observation Mission, Report of the EU Election
Observation Mission on the Parliamentary Elections which took place in Zimbabwe on
24th and 25th June 2000, chapter 3, 10-11.
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December was extended until 19 December.54  The  roll was then supposed to close on 27
January,  but was then – without advertisement or legal sanction extended until 3
March.55  Media reports suggest that registration continued only in rural ZANU(PF)
heartlands. This situation was legalised after the fact, through a presidential order.56
A further problem was that, unlike in previous elections, no receipts or voters
cards were issued to prove that one had indeed registered.  Ironically, in the 1995 election
the issuing of such cards had led to many complaints.57  However, the lack of proof of
registration was now an issue, because many people claimed to have registered, but their
names did not appear on the roll. In these elections one needed a National ID (or
temporary ID) or passport to register and to vote. During both the 2000 and 2002
elections, there were reports that ZANU (PF) activists, youth militias and war veterans
were forcing people to hand over their identification documents if they could not produce
up-to-date ZANU party cards or chant ZANU slogans.58  The Registrar-General’s office,
which is also responsible for issuing IDs was reported to be refusing to issue new or
replacement IDs until after the election.59
In the presidential elections of 2002, controversy also followed the Registrar-
General’s requirement for voters to prove that they lived in the constituency.60  This
requirement disqualified many ‘lodgers’ – people informally sharing houses or backyard
shacks in the high density areas of Harare and Chitungwiza, who were unable to produce
water or electricity bills in their names.  In rural areas, residence was said to be validated
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by headmen, who would accompany voters to polls, raising the issue of ruling party
influence, as most headmen were believed to be ZANU(PF). The MDC contested the
principle that voters vote in their constituency, when all of Zimbabwe was considered to
form a single constituency for the presidential election. Judge Rita Makarau agreed with
the MDC’s interpretation and struck down the requirement, but the government appealed
her ruling.61
The other significant issue in the 2002 elections was the eligibility to vote of
former dual citizens.  In 2001, the citizenship act was amended to require further proof of
renunciation of citizenship.  Previously Zimbabweans had been required to renounce their
citizenship to Zimbabwean authorities, but the new act required that they renounce it to
the authorities of the second citizenship, and provide documentary evidence that they had
done so.62 This regulation affected many descendents of  Malawian, Zambian and
Mozambican immigrants, but was widely thought to be targeting whites. The Registrar-
General was empowered to unilaterally make changes to electoral roll.63  A court ruling
in January stated that that the registrar-general could not remove voters from the voter’s
roll without giving them notice and the right to appeal.64 The law was then changed  by
gazette (ie not through Parliament), such that the Registrar-General was directed to create
a list of citizens who had either renounced their Zimbabwean citizenship, or, who was
deemed to have lost their citizenship with the entry of the new law.65  This list was to be
kept at each polling station, and “any person whose name appears on the list … shall not
be entitled to vote at the election, notwithstanding that his name appears on the roll for
any constituency” unless the voter could prove that he had successfully appealed or had
an appeal pending.66
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64   “Mudede ordered not to tamper with voters’ roll” Daily News 4 January 2002.
65   GOZ. Electoral Act (Modification) (No. 2) Notice, 2002; Statutory Instrument  42B of
2002.
66   GOZ.  Electoral Act (Modification) Notice, 2002  Statutory Instrument  41D of 2002.
16
Many of those who complied by renouncing their other citizenships nevertheless
received letters from the Registrar-General stating:
You are hereby   notified that I have reason to believe - (a) that you are
not entitled to be registered as a voter in . . . (b) that   you are not qualified
for registration as a voter in . .  on the grounds that you have in terms of
Schedule 3    section 3 (3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe ceased  to be a
citizen of Zimbabwe and that, unless you give notice of appeal . . . before
the expiration of seven  days from the date of this notice.67
 Many of those receiving such a letter, including Garfield Todd, the former PM, found
that it had been delivered on, or after, the last date for appeal.68  The names of many other
voters such as opposition MPs, in addition to the alleged dual citizens, registered on a list
made available in January, were not on the roll issued shortly before the election.69 The
very basis of the electoral roll also came into question when it was discovered that
registration had continued in some rural areas, after  the official closing date, without any
public announcement.70
Postal ballots were equally problematic.  Whereas the Electoral Act had
previously provided for Zimbabweans away from their constituencies — whether abroad
or elsewhere in the country — to vote by postal ballot, on 7 June 2000 the President
amended the Act so that only military serving outside Zimbabwe, diplomatic staff posted
overseas,  constituency registrars, presiding officers and polling officers could take
advantage of postal ballots.71  This disenfranchised Zimbabweans overseas and people
serving as monitors during elections in constituencies other than their own.72  Both of
these groups, especially Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa, had been highly
critical of the regime during the Constitutional Commission hearings, and were thought
to support  the MDC.  This restriction was re-enforced in the 2002 elections.73
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In 2000, postal ballots issued to nearly 6 000  military personnel serving in the
DRC were later ruled invalid  by the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the Registrar-
General had not complied with the regulations.74  The intended recipients had not signed
the ballot application forms or the signatures had not been witnessed.75  In some
constituencies in Mutare there were also questions about people voting more than once,
either through multiple postal ballots or  once with a postal ballot and once in person.76
Observers and Monitors
International observers and local monitors, most of whom represented NGOs and/or were
funded by NGOs,  were obstructed from observing both elections. The presence of
foreign observers had not been an issue in previous elections, because there had been
little interest in observing the elections.  So there was no precedent, and no agreed upon
procedure for vetting or approving foreign observers.  In 2000 it was widely rumoured
that no British observers would be permitted, although no formal legislation was ever
issued to that effect.  A group of observers from Kenya funded by Britain were not
permitted entry into the country.  On June 7 the government gazetted new regulations
specifying that, while the ESC could appoint Zimbabweans as monitors, the Election
Directorate would “on the recommendation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” accredit
foreign observers after the payment of USD 100.77
The ESC, headed by former ZANU (PF) politician Elaine Raftopoulos as acting
chair, took the Registrar-General to court, alleging that, by claiming the power to accredit
foreign observers, he had usurped the ESC’s role.78  As this case went to court, the
government quickly appointed Gula-Ndebele head of the ESC. On 20 June the High
Court ruled against the ESC, saying that there was no constitutional reason that the
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Registrar-General’s office ought not to have responsibility for accrediting observers.79
On the same day, a press statement was released stating that no further foreign observers
would be accredited, meaning that only a few hundred already accredited EU and
Commonwealth observers would be in the field.80  However, after much  conflicting
information, the  ZCC/AACC/WCC and Congress of South Africa Trades Unions
(COSATU) delegations were accredited with one day to spare before the election, but
other groups including the National Democratic Institute (NDI),  International
Republican Institute (IRI), and Oxfam Canada were black-listed.81
In 2002, the rejection of some international observers generated the most media
interest, although it probably had relatively less impact on the freedom and fairness of the
elections than any of the above-mentioned issues.   The General Laws Amendment bill
obstructed both local and foreign organisations from monitoring/observing elections in
Zimbabwe:  “no individual may monitor any elections unless they are accredited by the
Registrar-General's Office which would provide training and accreditation of the
monitors”.82 In a parliamentary debate, Justice Minister Chinamasa justified this move by
stating that:
We cannot allow people who are our enemies to  come to our soil.    Those
organisations and countries who come with the prejudicial view that
Zanu PF will not win the election will not get the privilege to tread on our
soil. 83
In January, President Mugabe announced that the following organizations were
welcome to send observers:
The Organisation of African Unity/Africa Union (OAU/AU); the Southern
Africa Development Community (Sadc); the Common Market for East
                                             
79  “ESC loses case over polls” Herald 22 June 2000.
80 GOZ, “Zimbabwe Parliamentary Elections 2000: Accreditation of elections” Press
Release, Department of Information, 20 June 2000.
81  Research Notes, 20-22 June 2000; ZCC, Report of Ecumenical Peace Observer
Mission, n.d. 9; “UK-sponsored observers barred” Herald 19 June 2000; “216 more
election observers barred” Herald 21 June 2000; “Government bars 40 US observers”
Daily News, 21 June 2000.
82 “Gula-Ndebele opposes plans to amend lectoral  laws” Daily News 3 January 2002.
83 “Government to bar poll observers from 'hostile  states', says Chinamasa” Daily News
26 November 2001.
19
and Southern Africa (Comesa); the Economic Community of West
African States (Ecowas); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the
Common-wealth, excluding the United Kingdom; the joint ACP-EU
delegation (excluding the United Kingdom) and led by the ACP; the
National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP)
from the United States of America; individuals and countries to be invited
in their own capacities include the Federal Republic of Nigeria.84
The World Council Of Churches/All Africa Council Of Churches/Zimbabwe Council Of
Churches were also allowed to observe, on the condition that they did not include
delegates from certain countries including Canada, US, England, Germany, Holland,
Australia, and Denmark.85
Although domestic electoral law did not provide for either monitors or observers,
in the 1995 election the ESC had asked local civil society groups to assist them in
monitoring the election.86  It was anticipated that the same procedure would again be
followed in the 2000 election and NGOs had been training monitors in preparation.87  It
was expected that there would be over 20 000 trained monitors, mostly representing local
churches and NGOs.  The ESC’s inclusion of NCA members as monitors came under
attack from the Attorney-General, who accused the ESC of contravening the Electoral
Act.88  Presumably for this reason, on 20 June 2000, a further amendment was gazetted,
which specified that only one monitor could be deployed in each polling station.89  As the
ESC had envisaged six  monitors at each station, this  meant that only one fifth of the 20
000 or more trained monitors would be deployed.  The Elections Directorate was
convinced to relax this somewhat by the new Chair of the ESC.  It agreed that four
monitors would be accredited to each polling station,  two during the day and two during
the night; only one monitor would be allowed inside the polling station at a time.90
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Like the accreditation of observers, the accreditation of monitors was confused by
misinformation and administrative delays. The EU Observer mission commented  “the
confusion over the role of domestic monitors was not due to administrative incompetence
but to a deliberate attempt to reduce the effectiveness of independent monitoring of the
election.”91  Three modes of identification of monitors had been arranged by the ESC:
cardboard badges, T-shirts and  pinneys.  However, the Registrar-General’s claim to
accredit monitors included the right to issue their own plastic badges incorporating
monitor’s ID numbers, so that when matched with a monitor’s National ID card, which
incorporates a photo,  it would be impossible for monitors to trade badges. These badges
were not distributed to the NGOs until Friday 23rd June which made it almost impossible
to get the badges to the monitors.  Only 8000 badges were ever printed, and the badges
then had to be dispatched to the correct constituencies. Mistakes in this frantic process
meant that Matabeleland supervisors were being sent badges for monitors based in
Manicaland and vice versa.92  Despite all this, in many areas presiding officers paid little
attention to these regulations and allowed in four to five monitors in the polling station,
regardless of whether they had IDs or not.93
In 2000,  local church and election monitoring groups unanimously condemned
the election as neither free nor fair.  Their position, as sub-contractors to the ESC, further
meant that the data on which it was supposed to base its report to Government, was
highly critical.94   This led to an announced ban on churches and NGOs conducting civic
education in the lead-up to the 2002 elections.95 The Chair of the ESC later modified this
decision saying that churches and NGOs could provide voter education, if their materials
were first approved by the ESC.96 And, in late February, the MDC won a victory in
which the court ruled: “It is ordered that the General Laws Amendment Act number two
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of 2002 was not lawfully enacted by Parliament and is, therefore, invalid and of no
effect.” 97 The government’s response was to reintroduce essentially the same
requirements as regulations, that is, through Presidential gazetting.98
In the end, 400 out of  12 000 monitors trained by the Zimbabwe Election Support
Network were accredited by the ESC.99  In practice most of the 2200 monitors trained
and accredited by the ESC were civil servants drawn from the police, army, and
teachers.100 Army personnel were also responsible for transport of ballot papers and
boxes to and from polling stations.101
V. What the observers said
The observers reports of the 2002 elections have been widely interpreted as reflecting a
north-south divide, but this is too simplistic an analysis; several southern observer teams
sharply criticised the elections.  Why are observer’s reports so inconsistent and mutually
conflicting?  Because, like journalists, observers became part of the story.  They could
not be neutral.  Not simply, as Mugabe suggested, because they marched only to the tune
of Tony Blair or felt an innate sympathy for white Zimbabweans,  but because they were
attacked, they were drawn into the conflict, not pushed out.
The most significant difference in observer’s reports reflects whether or not they
emphasized on the polling days, which all agree were relatively quiescent, or the lead-up
to the election, which was extremely violent. Similarly, some teams nalysed the
shortcomings of the institutions which administered the elections, while others
commented descriptively on the course of voting.
 The SADC parliamentary forum assessed the elections against the norms and
standards established by SADC in March 2001.  After considering a series of concerns
including the political and security climate, police conduct, voters roll, freedom to
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campaign, voting and counting, lack of independence of the electoral commission and
access to public media, they concluded:
 The climate of insecurity obtaining in Zimbabwe since the 2000
parliamentary elections was such that the electoral process could not be
said to adequately comply with the Norms and Standards for Elections in
the SADC region.102
In particular, they emphasised the ways in which Zimbabwe had neither met regional
standards, nor responded to previous recommendations:
Despite various recommendations and practices in the SADC region,
Zimbabwe is one of the countries without an Independent Electoral
Commission. The assignment of roles to three different electoral bodies,
the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC), the Election Directorate and
the Registrar-General's Office affects efficiency and causes duplication.
The government should seriously consider establishing an Independent
Electoral Commission as recommended by the Forum after the 2000
legislative elections and as held by the Norms and Standards of Elections
in SADC.103
In contrast, the brief OAU statement issued shortly after the conclusion of the elections,
mentions only the issue of voting:
Before deployment, the OAU Observer Team was briefed by the
Registrar-General, officials of the ESC, Ministers of Government, the
representatives of political parties and other political stakeholders.  During
the three days members of the Team observed the voting process,
verification and counting of votes.  The OAU Observer Team wishes to
commend the electoral and polling officers for the able manner in which
they conducted the elections.  The Team also wishes to commend the
people of Zimbabwe for conducting calm and peaceful elections.  On the
basis of observations made during the voting, verification and counting
process on the ground and the objective realities, the OAU Observer Team
wishes to state that in general the elections were transparent, credible, free
and fair.104
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The official delegation from South Africa did consider the pre and post elec ion  periods,
as well as such issues as freedom of the press.  They mentioned in some detail the
particular legal obstructionism that characterised the process:
The promulgation of laws, right up to and during the elections, that were
aimed specifically to cover  the administration, regulation and
management of the said elections; the reversal of some of these by  the
courts; the gazetting of regulations to over ride the courts - all created an
environment that not  only caused legislative uncertainty but also
threatened the integrity of the electoral process.
Their conclusion, however, was that in view of the large voter turn-out the election
“should be considered legitimate…. We are hopeful that now that the people of
Zimbabwe have spoken, the world will respect their  verdict.”105
South Africa’s Congress of Trades Unions (COSATU) issued its own statement,
based on the experience of its leadership, which formed part of the official South African
delegation (COSATU had been denied the right to send their own delegation in 2002).
COSATU explicitly challenged all the observer missions to explain the basis of their
judgments: “ Was it the SADC electoral code? Did it consider the Commonwealth Harare
Declaration or is the verdict based narrowly on Zimbabwe's controversial legislative
framework?.”106
VI. The politics of election observing in Africa
The scandal of election-monitoring in Africa is not the inconsistency between competing
reports on the Zimbabwe elections, which as we have seen resulted from competing
understandings of the role of election observers, coupled with the intense politicisation
surrounding the election.  The scandal is the inconsistency between the attention paid to
observers reports in Zimbabwe, when compared with other countries. Jonathan Steele’s
scathing analysis from the Guardian is worth quoting at length:
It was a disgraceful election which European Union observers and local
monitors severely censured. The media were controlled. Criticising the
president risked criminal charges. The police regularly moved in to
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prevent opposition candidates campaigning and the vote-count was
marked by irregularities. This sorry spectacle happened three weeks ago in
a former British colony in southern Africa. Statements of indignation from
Jack Straw? Not a murmur. Furious coverage in Fleet Street? A few
column inches on inside pages. Talk of "smart" sanctions to punish the
men who stole the election? You must be joking.107
Steele is of course not talking about Zimbabwe, but about Zambia.  Sir David Steel made
much the same point in the Scotsman:
The flaw in the international community's approach to Zimbabwe is that
we  have failed to take the whole process of election monitoring with
consistent  seriousness…. The failure … to insist on genuinely free and
fair  elections [in Tanzania and Zambia] or even to find them reported in
the world's press is a major reason  why all the fulminating against Robert
Mugabe's tyranny carried so little  conviction.108
These double standards may have resulted from the incremental development of el cti n-
observing: “the standards and rules applied by the international community have been
haphazard”.109  After the criticisms of election-observing in the early 1990s, which
particularly targeted the Commonwealth observers, certain observer teams appear to have
made much greater efforts to consider the preparations made for elections, as much as the
process of voting and counting on election day.
In the past commentators have suggested that: “local political realities can also
inhibit observers from expressing critical views….Observers inevitably seek to avoid
[precipitating violence or political instability], even if it means soft-pedaling their
findings.”110 Political dynamics meant that in Zimbabwe some observers were not
constrained from such condemnations (and may have been encouraged to make them),
while others were.  Observer decisions seem to have reflected not so much ‘local’
realities as the realities of their own experiences [opposition or government] and the
policy of their ‘sending’ organization or state.  If the critical accounts of the Zimbabwe
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election simply reflected the increasing sophistication of election observing, then we
might have expected similar reactions to observer reports from Tanzania and Zambia.
The reaction to Zimbabwe had less to do with the levels of violence or of electoral fraud
and much more to do with the international perception of the Mugabe government’s
attacks on white farmers and European donors.
It has long been recognised that the west’s attitude towards democracy in Africa
has been contingent on their own foreign policy agendas.  But in the years after the Cold
War, we were led to believe that a new approach would dominate, and that democracy
would be supported for its own sake.  Even if we didn’t quite believe in the promised
‘ethical foreign policy’  the funds allocated to democracy support, and the proliferation of
observer missions, suggested that some change might occur. But in reality, the very
process of observing the election became as political as the election itself.  It was
impossible, politically, for the OAU to line up against Mugabe, and with the
Commonwealth.  But at the same time, this created allegations of hypocrisy, when the
same leaders urged support for democratic governance under the framework of a ‘New
Partnership for Africa’.111  And the double-standards of both organisations may have
lingering and negative repercussions.  Increasing popular skepticism about their ability to
defend the interests of the voters – as compared to donor governments, incumbent
regimes, or opposition parties – may reduce their own legitimacy:
‘It is like when the Organisation of African Unity monitors bad elections’
said Placido Miko of the [Equatorial Guinea] Opposition Convergencia
para la Democracia Social (CPDS) referring to the cessation of human
rights monitoring in Equatorial Guinea, ‘They always support each other
and say everything is fine.  Things are not fine’.112
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